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The purpose of this work is to approach the way in which, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre thinks of conflict as the original way of encountering the other. Conflict is presented as the fundamental ontological dimension of intersubjective relationships. In this sense, the subjectivation-objectification dialectic does not correspond to a political or historical event, but these events are consequences of the ontological structure of human reality. |
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How do we perceive the agency of others? Do the same rules apply when interacting with others who are radically different from ourselves, like other species or robots? We typically perceive other people and animals through their embodied behavior, as they dynamically engage various aspects of their affordance field. In second personal perception we also perceive social or interactional affordances of others. I discuss various aspects of perceptible agency, which might begin to give us some tools to understand interactions also (...) |
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When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in (...) |
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The article has two aims: (a) to show how the notion of self proposed by Zahavi allows to underlie different aspects of personal identity; (b) to provide some elements that strengthen and complement the arguments of the Danish philosopher. First, I begin with a phenomenological analysis of the acts. Second, I study the identity and the various levels of the self that underlie it. Finally, I present some elements to constitute a metaphysics of the human person as a complement to (...) |
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On many standard readings, shame is an emotion that in an accentuated manner targets and involves the self in its totality. In shame, the self is affected by a global devaluation: it feels defective, objectionable, condemned. The basic question I wish to raise and discuss is the following: What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? What kind of self is it that is affected in shame? |
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Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding - in particular the understanding of emotional expressions - that are not (...) |
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Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This (...) |
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When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have— according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various think- ers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will con- trast Lipps’ account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of (...) |
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We first want to express our thanks to the commentators for their close and critical readings of The Phenomenological Mind. We would like to treat their comments and challenging questions as a productive opportunity to clarify and to make our positions more precise. Before we address the specific points raised by our colleagues, we do want to say that the intersection between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences is a rich one, and growing richer as collaboration and research continues. Our book (...) |
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Jean-Paul Sartre and Jan Patočka claim to go beneath the phenomenal correlation between the subject and the world discovered by Husserl in order to account for it from a more fundamental plane. Their going below the “universal a priori of correlation” allows them to describe it more thoroughly. But we wish to show that Sartre’s description remains dependent on a philosophical realism which prevents him from accounting for the genesis of the correlation. Patočka, however, achieves just this thanks to his (...) |
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Resumen: El objetivo del siguiente trabajo es explicar cómo la elaboración de una ontología de la naturaleza por parte de Merleau-Ponty se circunscribe en el intento de elaborar un pensamiento del ser que no haga de éste un elemento del pensamiento abstracto, sino que dé cuenta de la experiencia concreta del ser en el mundo. En este sentido, son fundamentales los conceptos de intercorporalidad, negatividad y dialéctica.: The aim of the following work is to explain how the elaboration of an (...) |
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