In this paper, I discuss Eugene Gendlin’s contribution to radically temporal discourse , situating it in relation to Husserl and Heidegger’s analyses of time, and contrasting it with a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that draw inspiration from, but fall short in their interpretation of the phenomenological work of Husserl and Heidegger. Gendlin reveals the shortcomings of these approaches with regard to the understanding of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, intersubjectivity, attention , reflective and pre-reflective (...) self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior. Gendlin traces the weaknesses of these approaches in the above areas to the way these perspectives construe time. (shrink)

A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...) últimas ideas husserlianas sobre la constitución eidética, encontrar una génesis pasiva del sentido ideal intencional sin perder su referencia egológica. Abstract: Despite the nuances and differences of meaning, the husserlian’s concept of intentionality supplies coherently that of classic true as adaequatio, even if adapted to the monadic order of transcendental conscience. We will show how Husserl’s analysis of inner time consciousness shows all the difficulties for an intentional interpretation of the passive sphere of consciousness, altering the peculiar vocation of intentionality to truth. Through the latest husserlian ideas on constitution, we will try to find a passive genesis to the ideal meaning of intentionality without losing its egologic reference. -/- . (shrink)

Phenomenology of Time and Temporality in Husserl and Heidegger Since objective time cannot be presupposed in phenomenology, the question of the constitution and nature of time represents a central task of every phenomenological analysis. The purpose of this contribution is to offer a comparison of the phenomenological analyses of time and temporality in Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and thereby to set out the fundamental differences of their approaches. In addition to the foundational lectures and texts On the Phenomenology of (...) the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893 – 1917), Husserl’s Bernau Manuscripts on time-consciousness (1917/18) and the late texts on temporal constitution (1929 – 1934), the C-Manuscripts, are considered. In the case of Heidegger, besides Being and Time and the lecture series The Basic Problems of Phenomenology from summer semester 1927, attention is focused primarily on the early lecture series and texts in which the development of his thinking becomes evident. Thereby it becomes clear that Heidegger’s question concerning the nature (Wesen) of time and history, with its point if departure from factical-historical life, from the outset moved in a different direction to that of Husserl. In conclusion, the principal differences of the two phenomenological approaches to time are drawn out and clarified in relation to the phenomenon of death. (shrink)

This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the “body” and of “protentionality” is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of (...) the phenomena in question, leading to concluding meditations on the differences between an “integrating” consciousness engaged in a project of knowing and an “improvisational” consciousness open to radical transformation. In the end, however, the Urzeitigung in which what is protended is simply “more time” holds good as the invariant governing the deep structure of both of these styles of consciousness. (shrink)

This study examines Edmund Husserl’s and Giovanni Bruno Vicario’s perspectives on time. Husserl’s work focuses on consciousness and its processes of synthesis, thus on a transcendental concept of time. Vicario, a member of the Trieste Gestalt school of psychology, rather explores the issue through an experimental perspective. This difference leads Vicario to criticize Husserl, reinterpreting and, sometimes, misunderstanding his texts. Through a careful textual analysis of Husserl’s and Vicario’s works on time, it is argued that, despite methodological differences, their views (...) can be integrated into a pluralistic understanding of time. This includes both phenomenological and psychological perspectives, and offers valid alternatives to a unified and physicalistic view of time. (shrink)

At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger rejects Husserl’s classical phenomenology on three grounds: he claims that Husserlian phenomenology is impaired by indeterminate concepts, by naïve personalism, and by obscurities in its account of individuation. The paper studies the validity of this early critique by explicating Husserl’s discourse on human persons as bodily-spiritual beings and by clarifying his account of the principles by which such beings can be individuated. The paper offers three types of considerations. After a summary of (...) Heidegger’s early critique of Husserl, the second section of the paper distinguishes between two dimensions of Husserl’s discourse on human persons. It argues that Husserl does not put forward one analysis of the being of humans, but explicates two different accounts and then studies critically their mutual relations of dependency: on the one hand, the naturalistic account of human beings as layered beings and on the other hand the personalistic account of human beings as peculiar kinds of unified wholes in which the mental and the bodily are inextricably intertwined. The third section of the paper clarifies Husserl’s theory of individuation and its consequences for our discourse on human persons. Finally, the fourth section explicates the conceptual means by which Husserl develops his account of human beings as persons. The paper ends in drawing some conclusions for contemporary philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial that persons have a particular ontology, and a temporal ontology at that. Yet attempting to “unpack” the intimate relation between the being of a person and time often leaves one frustrated and perplexed. Both Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson are explicitly concerned with the manner in which persons experience and understand time primitively. Both are concerned with taking our understanding of time away from the mere motions of a clock or the days of a calendar, and examining (...) how time and temporality are given to persons, and lived-through by persons. This paper demonstrates that, taken together as mutually supporting, Bergson’s and Husserl’s writings on time are able more clearly to express primordial structures of time itself and temporal experience. Applying the insights of Husserl’s analysis of passive syntheses to Bergson’s idea of temporal duration advances the project of personal, temporal, ontology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDerrida’s philosophy starts with a law stated in The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy: “No analysis could present, make present in its phenomenon or reduce to the point-like natur...

The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.

In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise (...) the contemporary relevance of Husserl's analysis. How does it measure up against one of the more recent analytical accounts? (shrink)

On Dan Zahavi’s Husserlian account of the subject, the self-temporalization of subjectivity presupposes what he calls an “immediate impressional self-manifestation.” It follows from this view that self-awareness is an inherent power of the one who will be subject, rather than a product of sociality introduced into life from without. In this paper, I argue against Zahavi’s position by going over the development of Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, examining the positions Husserl takes and the reasons that he comes to these positions. (...) Once we reach Husserl’s ultimate account, it becomes evident that Zahavi’s position is untenable. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the methodical disclosure of the lowest level of the constitution of time in Husserl’s phenomenology of time (especially in the C-Manuscripts), following this leading question: is it at all possible to disclose phenomenologically the primal-phenomenal constituting stream of consciousness? First, I address the different levels of constitution in order to focus on the ultimate level. Second, I analyse the “intentionality” of the primal-stream, by means of differentiating it from act-intentionality. Third, I outline the methodical function of (...) the reduction and of the phenomenologizing ego. Fourth, I present Abbau as the methodical possibility of reaching primal-phenomenality. Fifth, I address the problem of grasping the primal-phenomenal dimension in its originality. I will argue that we can grasp this fundamental dimension by means of a “phenomenological deconstruction” of constituted experience and at the same time by putting this dimension in an intentional relationship with the phenomenologizing ego. (shrink)

ABSTRACT“Time-consciousness” constitutes the core of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Extending from a project of reviving the comparative method, we develop Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of time as a method of literary comparison. Three views of time set the stage: the quatrain “Luán’s Fall” by the eighth-century Chinese poet Wang Wei, a stanza from the poem “Etched off‌” by Paul Celan, the quintessential post-war poet in German language, and the haiku “Walking, on and on” by the Japanese itinerant monk and free-verse haiku pioneer (...) Santoka Taneda. What makes these poems relevant is not merely their superficially shared theme of time, but an intrinsic affinity, manifested in different poetic “time-objects”, to the very notion of time-consciousness. Through poetic analysis in the context of Husserl’s philosophy of time-consciousness, these poetic experiences, embodied in a phenomenological concept of “walking,” emphasize time as being. (shrink)