This paper addresses the plausibility of practical apatheism: an attitude of apathy or indifference about philosophical questions pertaining to God’s existence grounded in the belief that they lack practical significance. Since apatheism is rarely discussed, we begin by clarifying the position and explaining how it differs from some of the other positions one may take with regard to the existence of God. Afterward, we examine six distinct objections to practical apatheism. Each of these objections posits a different reason for thinking (...) that belief in God is practically significant. Five of these objections prove unsuccessful. The sixth, which appeals to the practical significance of belief in God with respect to our fates in the afterlife, is more promising but nonetheless encounters significant obstacles. Since the success of this objection is controversial, whether we have good grounds to reject practical apatheism should be similarly controversial, and the view should be given further examination. (shrink)

Theories of ethics that attempt to incorporate divine speech or commands as necessary elements in the construction of moral obligations are often viewed as vulnerable to a challenge based on the so-called Euthyphro dilemma. According to this challenge, opponents of theistic ethics suppose that divine speech either informs one of a preexisting set of values and obligations, which makes it inconsequential, or is entirely arbitrary, which makes it irrational. This essay analyzes some of the debates on the nature of divine (...) commands in eleventh-century works of Islamic jurisprudence. I show that Muʿtazilī jurisprudents advanced the view that divine commands were actions performed in time that had concrete manifestations, while Ashʿarīs argued that divine speech in general, and commands in particular, were eternal divine attributes. After exposing certain weaknesses in the Euthyphro-inspired objections to theistic ethics, I argue that the Ashʿarī idea of commands as divine attributes is a promising move for scholars interested in defending a divine command view of moral obligation. (shrink)

Many people look to religion to help resolve the serious moral and legal issues associated with assisted reproductive technologies. Doing so presupposes that religion is the cornerstone of ethics, but this assumption is not well founded. While various faiths are entitled to articulate their views on matters of human reproduction, the contradictions involved in doing so make it unwise to rely on religion in the formulation of law and policy. These contradictions – such as the indeterminacy about what revealed truths (...) means – make moral secular philosophy a better guide for the protection of human welfare. (shrink)

در سنت برهان‌آوری کلاسیک، برهان‌های اخلاقی برای اثبات خدا اقامه شده است. به موازات این برهان‌ها و هم‌ارز با آنها براهین اخلاقی برای انکار خدا اقامه شده است. این سؤال مطرح می‌شود که آیا وجود برهان‌های اخلاقی در ردّ خدا به معنای بی‌اعتباری براهین اخلاقی در اثبات خداست؟ و آیا این براهینِ ضد باعث نمی‌شود ایمان خداباوران نامعقول باشد؟ ادعای ما این است که طرحی در زمینه بازتعریف برهان یافته‌ایم که می‌تواند سبب برون‌رفت براهین اخلاقی خداباوری از چالش برهان‌های اخلاقی (...) ضد باشد. در این پژوهش هشت برهان اخلاقی الحادی را در تاریخ فلسفه استخراج کردیم و طرح اصلاح ماهیت برهان از سوی ماورودس را بر آنها پیاده کردیم و نشان دادیم که خداباور می‌تواند همچنان از براهین اخلاقی خداباورانه دفاع کند و در باور به وجود خدا معقول باشد. البته توجه داریم که طرح اصلاح ماهیت برهان هزینه‌ای معرفت‌شناختی در پی دارد و آن این که براهین ضد نیز می‌توانند در چشم‌اندازها و دیدگاه‌های مورد پذیرش خود معقول انگاشته شوند. (shrink)