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Does Knowledge Depend on Truth?

Nick Zangwill

Acta Analytica 28 (2):139-144 (2013)

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Brutalist Non‐naturalism and Hume's Principle.Nick Zangwill - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (3):365-383.details I argue that non-naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessities may be explained as flowing from the essence of moral properties. It is still true that non-naturalism embraces necessary connections between distinct things, thus offending against ‘Hume's Principle’ according to which there are no such connections. Therefore, the apparent appeal of Hume's principle needs addressing. Hume's Principle faces a tsunami of counterexamples, of both abstract and non-abstract kinds of things. Furthermore, Hume's Principle lacks any motivation (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Epistemic Pluralism.Nick Zangwill - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):485-498.details In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very different facts may constitute knowledge. The paper argues for pluralism by arguing that very different facts can constitute the knowledge‐making links between beliefs and facts. If pluralism is right, we need not anxiously seek a unified account of the links between beliefs and facts that partly constitute knowledge in different cases of knowledge. The paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward in favour (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Epistemic/Non‐epistemic Dependence.Nick Zangwill - 2018 - Noûs:836-857.details I foreground the principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it from other relations and note what it does and does not entail. In particular, I distinguish between dependence and necessitation. This has many interesting consequences. On the negative side, many standard arguments in epistemology are subverted. More positively, once we are liberated from the necessary and sufficient conditions project, many fruitful paths for future epistemological investigation open up. I argue that that not being defeated does not (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Categorial versus naturalized epistemology.Nick Zangwill - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details How do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind. Such knowledge may be called “categorial.” The dialectical give and take between categorial and naturalized epistemology is pursued, before endorsing an argument that breaks the standoff (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
A Priori Knowledge that I Exist.Nick Zangwill - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):189-208.details I exist. That is something I know. Most philosophers think that Descartes was right that each of us knows that we exist. Furthermore most philosophers agree with Descartes that there is something special about how we know it. Agreement ends there. There is little agreement about exactly what is special about this knowledge. I shall present an account that is in some respects Cartesian in spirit, although I shall not pursue interpretive questions very far. On this account, I know that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Scepticism about Scepticism.Nick Zangwill - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (1):109-118.details Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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