The codification of language has both its advantages and disadvantages, both its prospects and its limitations. It is possible to determine this not from linguistic, but from meta-scientific, namely philosophical positions. At the heart of the codification procedure is the creation of specialized dictionaries based on a particular national language. The language of science is also always built on the basis of a certain national language — even if this language later serves as the language of international scientific communication (for (...) example, English). At the same time, codification of the language of science should reproduce the most significant resources of natural language as a symbolic system, as well as develop the institutional potential of science based on the capabilities of language as an institution. The codification of language of science should perform three main functions: descriptive-classification, system-legitimation and projective-predictive. The language of science is the embodiment of the symbolic universe studied by social phe- nomenologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and at the same time must correspond to the four main functions of the system of action, which were distinguished by Talcott Parsons. Codification is a relentless process that reflects and stimulates the development of language as a symbolic system, the meaning of which is set by specific language practices. The language of science is a set of all language practices of scientists in various fields, these practices must be harmonized through the codification of the language of science, while they constantly stimulate the renewal of codification of the language of science. It should be done through the creation of new practices and new scientific objects — and through the extrapolation of the application of existing terminology to new scientific fields as well. (shrink)

Investigation into the theme of receptions and influences is one of traditional topics in the historiography of national philosophies. This article analyses the models of reception and influence used by Ukrainian historians of philosophy: the model of “influence without reception” (А. Tykholaz), the model of “studying philosophy” (D. Tschižewskij) and the model of “reception without influence” (V. Horskyi). Resting upon works by J.-L. Viellard-Baron and P. Hadot, the author tried to argue that: а) the place that reception studies occupies in (...) historiography as well as understanding of its phenomenon is traditionally dictated by the perception of the historic-philosophical process, the genre of the historiography of philosophy and specific historiographic attitudes; b) reception is a complex phenomenon, which has totally different configurations and meanings in different periods of the history of philosophy and cannot be put into one formula; c) the application of obvious formulas from the contemporary vision of receptions in separate historical contexts can verify or objection of the originality or even the existence of separate philosophical traditions; d) through the reflection on the phenomenon of reception in all of its complexity it possible to reveal some aspects, research into which notably corrects our perception of the history of philosophy; e) the popular over the past decades idea of the history of philosophy as dialogue among philosophers is a challenge for the historiography, though it can have a positive effect on historic-philosophical research as well as on historic-philosophical discourse in general. Particularly, the research into reception and using dialogue as a regulatory idea can influence the international circulation of ideas and contribute to turning it into “rational dialogue”, promoted by P. Bourdieu. (shrink)

On November 25, 2019, a scientific seminar organized by the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy was held at the Department of the History of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The main topic of discussion was the status of the oral history of philosophy as a scientific discipline: its research goals and place among research practices. There were two main points in the discussion: OHF as a set of empirical interview-based methods and OHF as a (...) separate historico-philosophical discipline with its own area of research. Were also discussed the criteria of distinguishing between "philosophical" OHF and OHF, which is a simple application of oral history techniques in the realm of interviewing philosophers. (shrink)

The article analyses how the oral history of philosophy can be conceptualized as a genre and a discipline of the history of philosophy. The need for this kind of conceptualization arose due to recent spreading of interviews in the genre of the oral history of philosophy, which in turn became a subject for the special issue The Oral History of Philosophy in Filosofska Dumka. Analysing this issue, the author proves that the “dialoguing” nature of the interview builds inflated expectations about (...) the oral history as well as its boundaries as an approach in a historical-philosophical study. He also suggests distinguishing the interview as a genre of oral philosophy – dialogue, which is a traditional philosophical literary form, from a tool in historical-philosophical study. In the latter case, it is important to determine who will play a role of a historian: an author of historical narration, an interviewee or an interviewer. Depending on the answer to the previous question, the author distinguishes three possible perspectives of the oral history of philosophy development: an interview as a self-sufficient study in the history of philosophy, an interview as a self-sufficient source for historical-philosophical research and an interview as one of sources for historical-philosophical research. Each of them has its opportunities for a historian of philosophy and plays its role in recruiting students and doctoral students (who often are involved as interviewers) to research work. (shrink)