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Seeing, visualizing, and believing: Pictures and cognitive penetration

In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 298-327 (2015)

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  1. The Transition Into Virtual Reality.Mark Silcox - 2019 - Disputatio.
    In “The Virtual and the Real,” David Chalmers argues that there is an epistemic and ontological parity between VR and ordinary reality. My argument here is that, whatever the plausibility of these claims, they provide no basis for supposing that there is a similar parity of value. Careful reflection upon certain aspects of the transition that individu- als make from interacting with real-world, physical environments to interacting with VR provides a basis for thinking that, to the extent that there are (...)
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  • Is Phenomenal Force Sufficient for Immediate Perceptual Justification?Lu Teng - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):637-656.
    As an important view in the epistemology of perception, dogmatism proposes that for any experience, if it has a distinctive kind of phenomenal character, then it thereby provides us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world. This paper rejects dogmatism by looking into the epistemology of imagining. In particular, this paper first appeals to some empirical studies on perceptual experiences and imaginings to show that it is possible for imaginings to have the distinctive phenomenal character dogmatists have in (...)
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  • Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon‐Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...)
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  • Encapsulated Social Perception of Emotional Expressions.Joulia Smortchkova - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:38-47.
    In this paper I argue that the detection of emotional expressions is, in its early stages, informationally encapsulated. I clarify and defend such a view via the appeal to data from social perception on the visual processing of faces, bodies, facial and bodily expressions. Encapsulated social perception might exist alongside processes that are cognitively penetrated, and that have to do with recognition and categorization, and play a central evolutionary function in preparing early and rapid responses to the emotional stimuli.
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  • Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2018 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. Routledge. pp. 49-88.
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  • XV—Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.
    It is often assumed that while beliefs redound on the rational standing of a subject, perceptions do not. An irrational belief detracts from the rationality of believers, according to this assumption, but perceptions cannot do the same. I argue that perceptual experiences can have a rational standing, and that their epistemic status can be modulated by other psychological states that help produce them. Drawing on a metaphor from electricity, I call the epistemic status that perceptual experiences can have ‘epistemic charge'.
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  • Theory-Ladenness: Testing the ‘Untestable'.Ioannis Votsis - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I investigate two potential ways to experimentally test the thesis that observation is theory-laden. One is a proposal due to Schurz and the other my own. The two are compared and found to have some features in common. One such feature is that both proposals seek to create conditions that compel test subjects with diverse theoretical backgrounds to resort to bare observational judgments. Thus, if judgments made under those conditions are convergent across test subjects, the said convergence (...)
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  • Twofold Pictorial Experience.René Jagnow - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Richard Wollheim famously argued that figurative pictures depict their scenes, in part, in virtue of their ability to elicit a unique type of visual experience in their viewers, which he called seeing-in. According to Wollheim, experiences of seeing-in are necessarily twofold, that is, they involve two aspects of visual awareness: when a viewer sees a scene in a picture, she is simultaneously aware of certain visible features of the picture surface, the picture’s design, and the scene depicted by the picture. (...)
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  • Disagreement From the Religious Margins.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):371-395.
    Religious communities often discourage disagreement with religious authorities, on the grounds that allowing it would be epistemically detrimental. I argue that this attitude is mistaken, because any social position in a community—including religious authority—comes with epistemic advantages as well as epistemic limitations. I argue that religious communities stand to benefit epistemically by engaging in disagreement with people occupying other social positions. I focus on those at the community’s margins and argue that religious marginalization is apt to yield religiously important insights; (...)
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