L’auteur du De Intellectu connaît le De Anima d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et il offre une interprétation néoplatonicienne de ce texte dans sa considération de la doctrine noétique d’Aristote du De Anima 3.5. Cette interprétation révèle précisément cette autonomie philosophique par opposition à un examen purement philologique des textes aristotéliciens que le présent volume explore. Le De Intellectu, en raison de son caractère néoplatonicien, doit dater de quelque deux à quatre siècles après Alexandre. Il ne contient aucune référence à un Aristote de (...) Mytilène, maître d’Alexandre, contrairement à ce qui a été suggéré. (shrink)

Modern thought would present only an incomplete and fragmentary picture of philosophy to us if we were to regard it as being completely disconnected from the elemental forces and sources of Greek philosophy. The corrective aspect that protects it from any such attempt at unmethodical isolation is, however, given within itself and in its own content. Its own inner progress necessarily leads it back to the principles and questions that distinguished Greek speculation, which it embodied in typical forms. The thought (...) of the modern age proves its specificity in the fact that, notwithstanding the richness of content that it gains, it remains conscious of its relatedness to these basic logical forms and strives to return to them of its own accord. They will thus themselves appear to us of their own accord and incite us to regard their contents, if we just allow ourselves to follow the course of the investigation. (shrink)