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  1. Death, taxes and uncertainty: Economic motivations in end-of-life decision making.George Slade Mellgard & Jacob M. Appel - 2022 - Clinical Ethics 17 (1):90-94.
    Economic motivations are key drivers of human behavior. Unfortunately, they are largely overlooked in literature related to medical decisionmaking, particularly with regard to end-of-life care. It is widely understood that the directions of a proxy acting in bad faith can be overridden. But what of cases in which the proxy or surrogate appears to be acting in good faith to effectuate the patient’s values, yet doing so directly serves the decision-maker’s financial interests? Such situations are not uncommon. Many patients care (...)
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  • End-of-life decision making in Taiwan: healthcare practice is rooted in local culture and laws that should be adjusted to patients' best interests.Siew Tzuh Tang - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (6):387-388.
    The observed Taiwanese neonatal professionals' more conservative attitudes than their worldwide colleagues towards end-of-life (EOL) decision making may stem from cultural attitudes toward death in children and concerns about medicolegal liability. Healthcare practice is rooted in local culture and laws; however that should be adjusted to patients' best interests. Improving Taiwanese neonatal professionals' knowledge and competence in EOL care may minimize ethical dilemmas, allow appropriate EOL care decision making, avoid infants' suffering, and ease parents' bereavement grief.
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  • Advance Medical Decision-Making Differs Across First- and Third-Person Perspectives.James Toomey, Jonathan Lewis, Ivar R. Hannikainen & Brian D. Earp - 2024 - AJOB Empirical Bioethics:1-9.
    Background Advance healthcare decision-making presumes that a prior treatment preference expressed with sufficient mental capacity (“T1 preference”) should trump a contrary preference expressed after significant cognitive decline (“T2 preference”). This assumption is much debated in normative bioethics, but little is known about lay judgments in this domain. This study investigated participants’ judgments about which preference should be followed, and whether these judgments differed depending on a first-person (deciding for one’s future self) versus third-person (deciding for a friend or stranger) perspective. (...)
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