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From Experience to Experiencer

In Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul. Continuum Press. pp. 168 (2010)

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  1. Evolution, Emergence, and the Divine Creation of Human Souls.Christopher Hauser - forthcoming - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
    In a series of publications spanning over two decades, William Hasker has argued both that (1) human beings have souls and (2) these souls are not directly created by God but instead are produced by (or “emergent from”) a physical process of some sort or other. By contrast, an alternative view of the human person, endorsed by the contemporary Catholic Church, maintains that (1) human beings have souls but that (2*) each human soul is directly created by God rather than (...)
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  • Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.
    Epiphenomenalist dualists hold that certain physical states give rise to non-physical conscious experiences, but that these non-physical experiences are themselves causally inefficacious. Among the most pressing challenges facing epiphenomenalists is the so-called “paradox of phenomenal judgment”, which challenges epiphenomenalism’s ability to account for our knowledge of our own conscious experiences. According to this objection, we lack knowledge of the very thing that epiphenomenalists take physicalists to be unable to explain. By developing an epiphenomenalist theory of subjects and mental states, this (...)
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  • From the emergent property of consciousness to the emergence of the immaterial soul or mind's substance.Ahmad Ebadi & Mohammadmahdi Amoosoltani - 2021 - HTS Theological Studies 77 (4):1-8.
    According to property-emergentism, consciousness is an emergent property of certain aggregate neurological constructions, whereas substance-emergentism maintains that the emergence of consciousness depends on the emergence of mental substance or soul. In this article, we presented some arguments supporting substance-emergentism by analysing various properties of consciousness, including the first-person perspective, referral state, qualia, being active, causative, non-atomic, interpretative, inferential and inventive. We also explored the impossibility of representing big images on the small monitor and the incapacity of physical entities being conscious (...)
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  • Hume’un Algılar Demeti Kuramı ve Zihin Felsefesi Tartışmalarına Etkisi.Alperen Saz - 2021 - Religion and Philosophical Research 4 (7):92-116.
    This article aims to identify the bundle theory and its influence on the philosophy of mind discussions. The theory was put forward by David Hume, one of the pioneer philosophers of the Enlightenment era, in the context of personal identity. Firstly, a general framework will be drawn about the problem of personal identity. Secondly, it will be explained how the problem is understood in Hume’s epistemology through concepts such as person, identity, self, selfhood. To see the philosophical effects caused by (...)
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  • Against Emergent Dualism.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 73-86.
    Emergent substance dualism is explained in detail and several criticisms are raised against the view.
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  • Immaterialist solutions to puzzles in personal ontology.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    What are we? Despite much discussion in historical and contemporary philosophy, we have not yet settled on an answer. A satisfactory personal ontology, an account of our metaphysical nature, will be informed by issues in the metaphysics of material objects. In the dissertation, I target two prominent materialist ontologies: animalism, the view that we are numerically identical to human organisms, and constitutionalism, the view that we are constituted by, but not identical to, human organisms. Because of the problems that arise (...)
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  • Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
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  • Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.
    There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substance dualism given the current state of the debate. The best known type of substance dualism, Cartesian dualism, has traditionally faced a number of (...)
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  • Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion.James Madden - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):664-676.
    Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to accept either some version of dualism or physicalism when considering the mind–body problem. Likewise, recent philosophers of religion typically assume that we must work within these two categories when considering problems related to the possibility of bodily resurrection. Recently, some philosophers have reintroduced the Thomistic version of hylomorphism. In this article, we will consider the distinctive doctrines of Thomistic hylomorphism and how they can be used to address concerns about both the mind–body problem and (...)
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  • Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.Igor Gasparov - 2013 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1):109-123.
    In this paper I would like to defend three interconnected claims. The first stems from the fact that the definition of substance dualism recently proposed by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of the doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for genuine substance dualism, as distinct from quasi-dualisms, and provide a definition for genuine substance dualism that I consider more appropriate than Zimmerman’s. The second is that none of the currently (...)
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  • (1 other version)Should the Number of Overlapping Experiencers Count?A. Arturo Javier-Castellanos - 2021 - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    According to the cohabitation account, all the persons that result from a fission event cohabit the same body prior to fission. This article concerns a problem for this account. Suppose Manuel and Jimena are suffering from an equally painful migraine. Unlike Jimena, however, Manuel will undergo fission. Assuming you have a spare painkiller, whom should you give it to? Intuitively, you have no more reason to give it to one or the other. The problem is that the cohabitation account suggests (...)
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  • Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism applied to mental causation and neural correlates of consciousness.Matthew Keith Owen - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
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  • Imago Dei, dualism, and evolution: A philosophical defense of the structural image of God.Aku Visala - 2014 - Zygon 49 (1):101-120.
    Most contemporary theologians have distanced themselves from views that identify the image of God with a capacity or a set of capacities that humans have. This article examines three arguments against the structural view and finds them wanting. The first argument is that the structural view entails mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary philosophy. Against this, I argue that contemporary forms of dualism are able to circumvent such worries and are at least prima facie (...)
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  • You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
    According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.
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  • Persons, Minds, and Bodies: Christian Philosophy on the Relationship of Persons and Their Bodies, Part I.Aku Visala - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):713-722.
    The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been a central topic of debate in Western philosophy and theology. This article reviews the ongoing debates about the relationship and nature of bodies, minds, and persons among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The first two parts present some general theological constraints for philosophical theories of persons and describe the basic concepts used (substance, property, supervenience, and physicalism). The views themselves fall into three broad categories. Dualists think that persons are either (...)
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