What does evaluation mean? This article examines the evaluative process as a practical judgment that links a situation to a set of values in order to decide upon a course of action. It starts by discussing A. Sen’s “relational” and “comparative” account of evaluation, built in critical dialogue with J. Rawls’ deductive theory. Comparison, incompleteness, reality, and deliberation are the key principles of Sen’s approach, which, in some respects, echoes that of J. Dewey. The second part shows the relevance of (...) completing Sen’s approach with Dewey’s pragmatism, since Dewey’s emphasis on practical judgment is a useful counterbalance to Sen’s focus on evaluation as a cognitive process. Dewey introduces a shift from values to valuation and draws a distinction between prizing and appraising, which makes the logic of inquiry and the search for consistency between means and ends in a given situation the fulcrum of evaluation. The third part of this paper addresses the relationship between values and norms in evaluative processes. Neither Sen nor Dewey deals with this question in a systematic way, although norms, which are both similar and different from values, contribute to frame evaluations in different ways: as horizons, resources, or constrains. Bringing norms into the picture means completing the pragmatist account with an institutionalist perspective, as we suggest through the example of the evaluation of work. (shrink)

Is there such a sub-discipline as “sociology of valuation and evaluation”? Identifying the main focus, the topics, and the analytical designs, i.e., reflecting on a theoretical profile of such an investigation, is far from complete. The main question is indeed—where to start when addressing the sociology of valuation and evaluation? Is it a specific area of research, analysis, and inquiry, with specific objects? Should we confine it to the many important qualitative and quantitative studies dedicated to the measure of market (...) performance, the efficiency of public policy, profitability of private investment, or identification of best practices in various areas ? Beyond business and administration processes, a huge body of research in economic sociology has developed in recent years that has renewed the investigations on economic experience through a moral lens (Lamont 2000; Vatin 2008; Karpik 2010; Beckert and Aspe .. (shrink)

The article inquires into some of the most relevant current transformations of the idea of the social in contemporary European welfare capitalism. Some crucial institutional ideas — employability and activation — of EU welfare capitalism and their connections with the new spirit of capitalism — network capitalism — are discussed. In particular, the way these ideas contribute to enacting institutional regimes of justification, framing in this a new idea of the social, is explored. The features of the latter will be (...) deepened with particular concern for two constitutive elements of European societal self-representation — individualization (as a social ideal and project) and publicness (as a fundamental characteristic of the institutional programme) — and regarding emerging paradoxes characterizing their current development. Arguments will be advanced in order to show that the currently dominant institutional regime of justification does not have a univocal, one-way fate of development, and both ties and opportunities are reconfigured. The idea of the social, even if reframed according to the social and institutional logics the article explores, is a terrain of (cultural, political, social and institutional) conflict. In this, possible counter-factual interpretations of the emerging institutional devices and practices, already at work on the social stage, can be further developed and strengthened. (shrink)

Citizen participation, by now one of the main topics on the institutional agenda in many European countries, involves different fields of public action, mostly on a local level – social inclusion, urban renewal, development, the environment, health/social services, etc. It still remains, however, vague as a concept with a great variety of actors, procedures and powers involved in its practices. In this scenario, the present article asks two questions: what powers and what freedoms are involved in participation? How are they (...) constructed and increased? The article then goes on to argue how voice is relevant for understanding the many stories of participation, referring to the classic concept of voice formulated by Albert Hirschman and the elaborations offered by Amartya Sen and Arjun Appadurai in their dialogue over capabilities and capacities. (shrink)

Its importance for understanding social dynamics notwithstanding, the concept of agency is one of sociology’s more controversial ideas. The debate around this concept has mostly been developed at a theoretical level and the empirical studies tend to rely on socio-psychological interpretations of agency as a stable, inner force capable of influencing prospects, decisions, and behavior with little room for change in agency capacity. Social sciences, though, should take a more dynamic stance on agency and highlight the role of the different (...) elements of the social context that can enable or hinder individual agency capacity. Prompted by recent developments of the Capability Approach, this article proposes a framework for the study of agency that defines individual agency as the result of a conversion process of personal resources shaped by conversion factors. Conversion factors operate at micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis, each of which can be oriented toward past experiences, present conditions, and future prospects. This article also seeks to analytically distinguish three types of agency outcome: adaptation, autonomy, and influence. Such a framework will facilitate the transformation of the slippery notion of agency into more tractable empirical phenomena which increase its analytical and critical capacity. (shrink)

Several developments in the measurement of justice have drawn on Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities. This article addresses the relationship between Sen’s theoretical work and its interpretation in the measurement of justice, in particular by the United Nations Development Project and by the British Equality and Human Rights Commission and Government Equalities Office in its Equality Measurement Framework. It starts with a review of the diverse interpretations of Sen’s work, which range from considering it to be an innovative radical development (...) to locating his work within the liberal tradition. Central to the article is the question of whether it is possible to develop a meaningful operationalization of Sen’s philosophical distinctions, in particular that between capabilities and functionings, so as to inform measurement frameworks. It finds that on both conceptual and methodological grounds it is not possible to sustain this distinction in practice. This is illustrated by an analysis of the changing measurement of justice in frameworks developed by the UNDP and the UK government. Changes in the content of the measurement frameworks in radical or neoliberal directions are not constrained by Sen’s theoretical analysis, despite claims that Sen’s work informs these frameworks. The openness of Sen’s work means that it can be used by forces generated by the neoliberal environment to support their redefinition of justice. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to establish a theoretical foundation for food education in schools. Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA), an ethical theory concerning the freedom required to achieve one’s well-being, was applied to define the previously unchallenged ethical nature of food education. The analyses were informed by foundational CA concepts, Sen’s own perspectives on ‘food’ and ‘education’, and CA-based education studies. Through these analyses, the fundamental nature of food education was defined as follows: ‘Capability to eat well’ is (...) the freedom to convert commodities (such as food or pocket money) into the ‘functionings to eat well’ that constitute children’s ‘well-eating’ (Definition 1); and the objective of food education as public policy is to expand such capability to eat well (Def. 2). However, if an appropriate pedagogy is not employed, children’s capability can be reduced (Def. 3); therefore, to avoid this, the pedagogy has to enable them to perceive more ‘associations’ (in a Deweyan sense) between related conversion factors (Def. 4), as well as to choose and participate in the educational process (Def. 5). This theory not only elucidated the ethical nature of food education but also expanded the scope of the application of the CA to food issues. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Amartya Sen’s capability approach is often used in disability research as a normative framework for describing and evaluating the well-being of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, recently, the possibility of going beyond description to the use of the capability approach as an explanatory tool has been raised. However, to allow the use of the capability approach in this way requires grounding it in an appropriate research paradigm. In this paper, critical realism is adopted for this purpose. It is argued that (...) critical realism can provide the ontology needed to justify finding explanations for the way that people with disabilities achieve their valued capabilities. The assumption here is that there are real, emergent structures and mechanisms that underlie empirical capabilities; and that these structures and mechanisms are related to people’s agency, as described by critical realism’s conception of the relationship between structure and agency. (shrink)

In this paper, we first enumerate the problems that humans might face with a new type of technology such as robots with artificial intelligence (AI robots). Robotics entrepreneurs are calling for discussions about goals and values because AI robots, which are potentially more intelligent than humans, can no longer be fully understood and controlled by humans. AI robots could even develop into ethically “bad” agents and become very harmful. We consider these discussions as part of a process of developing responsible (...) innovations in AI robotics in order to prevent catastrophic risks on a global scale. To deal with these issues, we propose the capability-effectual approach, drawing on two bodies of research: the capability approach from ethics, and the effectual process model from entrepreneurship research. The capability approach provides central human capabilities, guiding the effectual process through individual goals and aspirations in the collaborative design process of stakeholders. More precisely, by assuming and understanding correspondences between goals, purposes, desires, and aspirations in the languages of different disciplines, the capability-effectual approach clarifies both how a capability list working globally could affect the aspirations and end-goals of individuals, and how local aspirations and end-goals could either energise or limit effectual processes. Theoretically, the capability-effectual approach links the collaboration of stakeholders and the design process in responsible innovation research. Practically, this approach could potentially contribute to the robust development of AI robots by providing robotics entrepreneurs with a tool for establishing a permissible action range within which to develop AI robotics. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous établissons d’une part que l’usage du concept de capabilité comme une simple « métrique » du développement humain est une vision réductrice de la proposition intellectuelle de Sen. D’autre part, nous montrons qu’il est vain d’attendre de la part de Sen une théorie de la justice en termes de droits à certaines capabilités. Notre démonstration passe par deux types d’arguments : 1) en reprenant l’hypothèse standard et originelle de la capabilité comme ensemble de vecteurs de fonctionnements (...) accessibles ( e.g., Sen 1987), nous mettons en évidence quatre implications théoriques de l’approche de Sen que la perspective du « welfarisme formel » (Fleurbaey 2003 ; D’Aspremont 2011) ne permet pas de saisir ; 2) nous confortons cette lecture en examinant l’hypothèse – sous-explorée jusque là – de la capabilité comme « pouvoir effectif » d’agir dans le sens de résultats que l’on valorise (Sen 2008, 2010). Dans les deux cas, il s’agit de montrer que la capabilité pour Sen est bien autre chose qu’une « métrique » de l’avantage personnel et de confirmer l’idée que Sen n’est pas un théoricien des capabilités tel que l’attendent la plupart des commentateurs (Baujard et Gilardone 2017). De surcroît, la seconde hypothèse amène à intégrer d’emblée la question de l’obligation morale dans le concept de capabilité. Dès lors, la capabilité non seulement n’est pas une métrique de l’avantage personnel, mais elle n’est même plus une représentation de l’avantage personnel. C’est ici qu’apparaît selon nous la véritable révolution conceptuelle de Sen qui, contrairement à ce que Ricœur (2004) avait cru lire, ne se trouve pas dans le couple droit-capabilité, mais dans le couple responsabilité-capabilité. Finalement, il ressort que Sen partage l’idée des tenants d’une économie de la personne (Ballet et al. 2014) selon laquelle une théorie de la justice en termes de droits à certaines capabilités resterait prisonnière d’une vision purement fonctionnelle de la liberté. Surtout, la mise en lumière de ce couple responsabilité-capabilité ouvre des perspectives nouvelles pour appréhender la liberté et la rationalité des personnes, au cœur notamment des questions de justice et de choix collectif. (shrink)

Cet article propose une réflexion sur la protection des capacités au travail à partir de Martha Nussbaum. Sa visée est de penser les conditions institutionnelles de l’accès aux capacités, dans le cadre du travail, en mettant en évidence les points de tension entre l’approche des capacités et d’autres approches libérales, contractualiste ou utilitariste, qui structurent l’organisation du travail dans la société de marché. Libérale d’un point de vue politique dans la lignée d’Emmanuel Kant, tout en s’intéressant comme Aristote et à (...) Karl Marx à la question des seuils et des libertés substantielles, Nussbaum permet de souligner dans le même temps les tensions qui traversent le travail contemporain et les conditions d’un développement humain au travail à partir d’une liste de capacités centrales et d’un seuil d’accès aux ressources nécessaires pour les mettre en œuvre. L’article s’appuie sur cette approche des capacités et la théorie de la justice de Nussbaum pour analyser les limites du droit, souligner les logiques institutionnelles qui conditionnent l’accès aux capacités au travail, et de distinguer les responsabilités collectives vis-à-vis du développement humain au travail. (shrink)