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  1. Can We Perceive Mental States?Eleonore Neufeld - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of mental state perception is to be understood in light of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, and reconstruct Non-Inferentialism in a way that makes the question at hand – whether we can perceive mental states or not – scientifically tractable. Next, I motivate Non-Inferentialism by showing that under the assumption (...)
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  • Wide Externalism and the Roles of Biology and Culture in Human Emotional Development.Jennifer Greenwood - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (4):423-431.
    In both the philosophy and psychology of emotion there is disagreement regarding the role of biology/genetics and culture/sociality in emotional development and experience. Using recent insights from developmental psychology and biology, and particularly recent developments in metaphysics of mind, I argue that distinctly human emotionality requires the complex interaction of both. Human neonates and caregivers are genetically preadapted to enable emotional ontogenesis in the context only of a complexly interdependent linguistically-mediated social relationship. This relationship provides the requisite sensory-perceptual stimulation to (...)
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  • I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411-424.
    The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually (...)
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  • Common Denominators in Research on Emotion Language: A Postscript.Anna Ogarkova & Philippe Borgeaud - 2009 - Social Science Information 48 (3):523-543.
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  • The Role of Language in Emotion: Predictions From Psychological Constructionism.Kristen A. Lindquist, Jennifer K. MacCormack & Holly Shablack - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Understanding Other Minds: A Criticism of Goldman’s Simulation Theory and an Outline of the Person Model Theory.Albert Newen & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):209-242.
    What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate persons having mental as (...)
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  • Affective Intentionality and Self-Consciousness.Jan Slaby & Achim Stephan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):506-513.
    We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that existential feelings are an important manifestation of self-consciousness and figure prominently in human (...)
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  • Self-Referential Emotions.Alexandra Zinck - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):496-505.
    The aim of this paper is to examine a special subgroup of emotion: self-referential emo- tions such as shame, pride and guilt. Self-referential emotions are usually conceptualized as (i) essentially involving the subject herself and as (ii) having complex conditions such as the capacity to represent others’ thoughts. I will show that rather than depending on a fully fledged ‘theory of mind’ and an explicit language-based self-representation, (i) pre-forms of self-referential emotions appear at early developmental stages already exhib- iting their (...)
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  • Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations.Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  • Shared Emotions and Joint Action.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):355-373.
    In recent years, several minimalist accounts of joint action have been offered (e.g. Tollefsen Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35:75–97, 2005; Sebanz et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(6): 234–1246, 2006; Vesper et al. Neural Networks 23 (8/9): 998–1003, 2010), which seek to address some of the shortcomings of classical accounts. Minimalist accounts seek to reduce the cognitive complexity demanded by classical accounts either by leaving out shared intentions or by characterizing them in a way that (...)
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  • Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception.Albert Newen, Anna Welpinghus & Georg Juckel - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):187-208.
    We develop a version of a direct perception account of emotion recognition on the basis of a metaphysical claim that emotions are individuated as patterns of characteristic features. On our account, emotion recognition relies on the same type of pattern recognition as is described for object recognition. The analogy allows us to distinguish two forms of directly perceiving emotions, namely perceiving an emotion in the absence of any top-down processes, and perceiving an emotion in a way that significantly involves some (...)
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