In reading Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, one is struck by Nāgārjuna’s separation of conventional truth and ultimate truth. At the most basic level, these two truths deal with emptiness and the appearance of fundamental existence, but the meaning of “conventional” lends itself to two key senses: concealing and socially agreed-upon norms and practices. The tension between these two senses and how they relate to truth leads Nāgārjuna’s Tibetan commentators in different directions in their exegesis on conventional truth. Based on the debate between (...) Tsongkhapa and Gorampa, I propose a Madhyamaka account of truth as trust. In so doing, I provide a novel account of truth, in which propositions and phenomena are truth-bearers, and one’s ability to trust in them establishes their truth-value. (shrink)