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  1. A world of difference: The fundamental opposition between transhumanist “welfarism” and disability advocacy.Susan B. Levin - 2023 - Bioethics 37 (8):779-789.
    From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that “welfarism” about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence—which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical bioenhancement—morally requires (...)
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  • Enhancing Gender.Hazem Zohny, Brian D. Earp & Julian Savulescu - 2022 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 19 (2):225-237.
    Transgender healthcare faces a dilemma. On the one hand, access to certain medical interventions, including hormone treatments or surgeries, where desired, may be beneficial or even vital for some gender dysphoric trans people. But on the other hand, access to medical interventions typically requires a diagnosis, which, in turn, seems to imply the existence of a pathological state—something that many transgender people reject as a false and stigmatizing characterization of their experience or identity. In this paper we argue that developments (...)
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  • Moving Through Capacity Space: Mapping Disability and Enhancement.Nicholas Greig Evans, Joel Michael Reynolds & Kaylee R. Johnson - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11):748-755.
    In this paper, we highlight some problems for accounts of disability and enhancement that have not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. The reason, we contend, is that contemporary debates that seek to define, characterise or explain the normative valence of disability and enhancement do not pay sufficient attention to a wide range of cases, and the transition between one state and another. In section one, we provide seven cases that might count as disability or enhancement. We explain why each (...)
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  • Competition, cooperation and human flourishing: commentary on Koch.Hazem Zohny - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):581-582.
    Mainstream bioethics takes after a competitive, individualistic understanding of biology and is ultimately rooted in libertarian 19th-century values. These in turn drive much of the enthusiasm for transhumanism and explain why disability in bioethics is often characterised as a lamentable deficiency. That, at least, is the concern raised by Tom Koch in his paper Disabling disability amid competing ideologies.1 He contrasts this paradigm with a cooperative, communal understanding of biology, and in turn, of bioethics—one which entails generally prioritising a socially (...)
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  • Disabling disability amid competing ideologies.Tom Koch - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):575-579.
    This paper critiques current arguments advancing the potential for transhumanism and a range of biological and pharmacological enhancements to better human flourishing. It does so from a historical perspective weighing the individualistic and competitive evolutionary theories of Darwin with the cooperative and communal theories of Prince Peter Kropotkin a generation later. In doing so it proposes the transhumanist and enhancement enthusiasts operate within a paradigm similar to Darwin’s, one that is atomist and individualistic. The critique, which considers the status of (...)
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  • Moral enhancement and the good life.Hazem Zohny - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):267-274.
    One approach to defining enhancement is in the form of bodily or mental changes that tend to improve a person’s well-being. Such a “welfarist account”, however, seems to conflict with moral enhancement: consider an intervention that improves someone’s moral motives but which ultimately diminishes their well-being. According to the welfarist account, this would not be an instance of enhancement—in fact, as I argue, it would count as a disability. This seems to pose a serious limitation for the account. Here, I (...)
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