Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Opportunity Costs and Resource Allocation Problems: Epistemology for Finite Minds.Endre Begby - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Overwhelmingly, philosophers tend to work on the assumption that epistemic justification is a normative status that supervenes on the relation between a cognitive subject, some body of evidence, and a particular proposition (or “hypothesis”). This article will explore some motivations for moving in the direction of a rather different view. On this view, we are invited to think of the relevant epistemic norm(s) as applying more widely to the competent exercise of epistemic agency, where it is understood that cognitive subjects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Regulating Social Media as a Public Good: Limiting Epistemic Segregation.Toby Handfield - 2023 - Social Epistemology:1-16.
    ABSTRACT The rise of social media has correlated with an increase in political polarization, which many perceive as a threat to public discourse and democratic governance. This paper presents a framework, drawing on social epistemology and the economic theory of public goods, to explain how social media can contribute to polarization, making us collectively poorer, even while it provides a preferable media experience for individual consumers. Collective knowledge and consensus is best served by having richly connected networks that are epistemically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Who’s Afraid of Adversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):873-886.
    Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations