Abstract

This chapter will directly engage what I call Aristotle’s “privileged virtue thesis,” which essentially holds that only a very small number of very privileged people have access to the kind of external goods and mentors that will allow them to flourish through the acquisition of the virtues. Another way of putting this is that virtue is so rare because good formation and mentorship are rare. Aristotle’s thesis is a difficult one to refute given what we know about social learning and the necessary conditions for true moral inspiration to spontaneously occur. Effective moral exemplars must be more than extraordinarily virtuous people that we fancy to imitate, they must also have a specific type of relationship with the student of virtue. Jennifer Herdt recalls this in Putting on Virtue, “What is crucial in order for one’s desires to be transformed into those of a virtuous person is that one love and be loved by the moral exemplar set before one.” As Herdt explains, this requirement is particularly poignant given that virtue is not a mechanical feat that can be produced through compliance. Instead, it requires cultivating affection for what is good. If we contend, as most virtue ethicists would, that moral exemplars are necessary for the acquisition of virtue and recognize the lack of suitable mentors among us, it is no wonder that Aristotle argues virtue is a privilege. However, this chapter will suggest that Christ provides a unique challenge to Aristotle’s privilege of virtue thesis because of the type of moral exemplar Christ is. Moreover, I contend that Peter Abelard’s theory of atonement, particularly its moral exemplarist dimensions, will be especially helpful in helping us understand why.