Models of Scientific Change

Abstract

This paper challenges premises regarding the ‘Kuhn vs Popper debate’ which is often introduced to students at a university level. Though I acknowledge the disagreements between Kuhn and Popper, I argue that their models of science are greatly similar. To begin, some preliminary context is given to point out conceptual and terminological barriers within this debate. The remainder of paper illuminates consistencies between the influential books The Logic of Scientific Discoveries (by Popper, abbreviated as Logic) and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (by Kuhn, abbreviated as Structure). The central purpose of this comparison is to synthesize a shared model of scientific change. The broader implication of this approach is appreciating common ground in discussions that are defined by their disagreements (particularly in philosophy of science).

Author's Profile

Benjamin Aguilar
Bates College

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2020-07-13

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