Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations

Synthese 191 (18):4315-4352 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The paper argues that on three out of eight possible hypotheses about the EPR experiment we can construct novel and realistic decision problems on which (a) Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory conflict (b) Causal Decision Theory and the EPR statistics conflict. We infer that anyone who fully accepts any of these three hypotheses has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. Finally, we extend the original construction to show that anyone who gives any of the three hypotheses any non-zero credence has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. However, we concede that no version of the Many Worlds Interpretation (Vaidman, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2014) gives rise to the conflicts that we point out
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-05-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Unified Dynamics for Microscopic and Macroscopic Systems.Ghirardi, GianCarlo; Rimini, Alberto & Weber, Tullio

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Do the EPR Correlations Pose a Problem for Causal Decision Theory?Koberinski, Adam; Dunlap, Lucas & Harper, William L.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
398 ( #8,169 of 43,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #15,218 of 43,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.