Sequential Choice and the Agent's Perspective

Abstract

Causal Decision Theory reckons the choice-worthiness of an option to be completely independent of its evidential bearing on its non-effects. But after one has made a choice this bearing is relevant to future decisions. Therefore it is possible to construct problems of sequential choice in which Causal Decision Theory makes a guaranteed loss. So Causal Decision Theory is wrong. The source of the problem is the idea that agents have a special perspective on their own contemplated actions, from which evidential connections that observers can see are either irrelevant or invisible.

Author's Profile

Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-27

Downloads
638 (#31,267)

6 months
112 (#55,389)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?