Sequential Choice and the Agent's Perspective

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Abstract
Causal Decision Theory reckons the choice-worthiness of an option to be completely independent of its evidential bearing on its non-effects. But after one has made a choice this bearing is relevant to future decisions. Therefore it is possible to construct problems of sequential choice in which Causal Decision Theory makes a guaranteed loss. So Causal Decision Theory is wrong. The source of the problem is the idea that agents have a special perspective on their own contemplated actions, from which evidential connections that observers can see are either irrelevant or invisible.
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Archival date: 2018-03-27
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2018-03-27

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