Racionalidad práctica: Phronesis y sindéresis para una teoría de la decisión moral

Stoa 8 (16):63-77 (2017)
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Abstract
In this article the concepts of prudence and synderesis are contrasted, the first from the Aristotelian point of view and the second from the School of Paris. Prudence is defined as the method for achieving the desired ends and synderesis as the natural ability to judge rightly. Although it has been thought that they are two concepts unequipable, in this work I argue that ( Φρόνησις - phronesis) prudence and (Συντήρηοη - synderesis) synderresis are two moments which are part of a theory of decision, with the condition that there are rational elements involved in moral deliberation, but, mostly,that is the product of an intuitive deliberation of person, based on first principles.
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Archival date: 2018-08-21
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