Una reivindicación de mente y voluntad frente al conductismo lógico de Ryle

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article describes four arguments presented Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind to argue that the concept of “mind” is a product of the false belief that there is a ghost in the machine, and this ambiguity is analyzed, it causes words as “will” take meaning in ordinary language. Besides the analysis of the arguments, we offer an answer to each of them and, finally, the idea that mind and will form part of the body and have an ontological support, although not possessing a separate existence from the same holding.
Keywords
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AHUURD
Upload history
First archival date: 2018-08-21
Latest version: 2 (2018-08-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-08-21

Total views
52 ( #42,382 of 51,448 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #38,327 of 51,448 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.