Dialecticality and Deep Disagreement
Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):173-179 (2018)
Abstract
In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.
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ISBN(s)
1584-174X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AIKDAD-2
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2018-12-01
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2018-12-01
Total views
214 ( #24,669 of 57,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #24,585 of 57,143 )
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