Dialecticality and Deep Disagreement

Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):173-179 (2018)
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In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.

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Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University


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