Multiple realization and methodology

Abstract

An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims of recent critics, we show that methodological connections between the neurosciences and psychology are plausibly often the result of multiple realization.

Author Profiles

Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Carl Gillett
Northern Illinois University

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Added to PP
2009-10-30

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