The Boundaries Still Stand: A Reply to Fisher

Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1):37 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In his recent critical notice of The Bounds of Cognition in this journal, Justin Fisher advances a set of concerns that favor the hypothesis that, under certain circumstances, cognitive processes span the brain, body, and world. One is that it is too much to require that representations in cognitive process must have non-derived content. A second is that it is possible that extended objects bear non-derived content. A third is that extended cognition might advocate the extension of certain general categories of cognition. A fourth is that Bounds misapplies Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ so-called “parity principle.” The purpose of this rejoinder is to show how Fisher’s concerns can be, or have already been, addressed
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-03-18
View other versions
Added to PP

74 (#59,407)

6 months
11 (#57,792)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?