The (multiple) realization of psychological and other properties in the sciences

Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and 2004 ) and use our work to rebut recent objections to the long-standing claim that psychological properties are multiply realized. For we use scientific evidence, in combination with our more precise theoretical framework, to show that we have strong reason to believe that psychological properties are indeed multiply realized both at the biochemical and neuronal levels.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AIZTMR
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-22
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
355 ( #15,950 of 58,355 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #19,634 of 58,355 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.