J.L. Austin ve I. Kant’ta Kategorik Önermeler ve Mental Nedensellik Problemleri
Sosyal, Beşeri Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 3 (8):624-631 (2020)
Abstract
One of the central figures of philosophy of language- John Langshaw Austin, attributes principles of
causation to the mere pragmatic language. Conversely, Kant tried to construct a “free human act” which
is independent from any physical determination except its innate motivations via his well-known the
phenomenal / noumenal distinction. That kind of Kantian metaphysical ground which addresses to the
noumenal field, he obviously tries to establish this behavioral causation again by denying Austinian
style pragmatic propositions or illocutionary acts. I claimed that sort of duality between Austin and
Kant, creates an epistemological problem with how propositions and actions relate. From a Kantian
position, it (indetermination) is overlooked by Austin's propositional doctrine, without being grounded
on any universal principle, but only with propositions that embraced by speech act theory.
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