J.L. Austin ve I. Kant’ta Kategorik Önermeler ve Mental Nedensellik Problemleri

Sosyal, Beşeri Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 3 (8):624-631 (2020)
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Abstract

One of the central figures of philosophy of language- John Langshaw Austin, attributes principles of causation to the mere pragmatic language. Conversely, Kant tried to construct a “free human act” which is independent from any physical determination except its innate motivations via his well-known the phenomenal / noumenal distinction. That kind of Kantian metaphysical ground which addresses to the noumenal field, he obviously tries to establish this behavioral causation again by denying Austinian style pragmatic propositions or illocutionary acts. I claimed that sort of duality between Austin and Kant, creates an epistemological problem with how propositions and actions relate. From a Kantian position, it (indetermination) is overlooked by Austin's propositional doctrine, without being grounded on any universal principle, but only with propositions that embraced by speech act theory.

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Atilla Akalın
Istanbul Gelisim University

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