Troeltsch: il compromesso della fede

In Stefano Caroti & Alberto Siclari (eds.), Filosofia e religione. Studi in onore di Fabio Rossi. Parma: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni. pp. 357-392 (2014)
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Abstract

The difficulties that Troeltsch faced in his intellectual endeavors derive from the ultimate dualism characterizing, in his perspective, the existence of man: namely a dualism between the historicity of his existence and the need of an ultimate meaning – and of the unity of such a meaning with life itself. According to Troeltsch, dualism is articulated on different levels, for the reason that the historical dimension of man is composed by different and often contrasting elements. Man, indeed, must satisfy immediate needs, deriving from his animal nature, but also organize himself in the economic, political and ethical spheres, ‘before’ entering the strictly religious one. The process of spiritualization of the natural dimension crosses all these areas: as a result, such a dimension is purified and oriented towards the unity of the ‘ultimate things’: a goal which is unattainable, as long as the natural dimension is ultimately historical. The Troeltschian category of compromise (Kompromiss) has not always been appreciated and perhaps has not always been properly understood. This attitude is well exemplified by the judgment of Benedetto Croce, for whom compromise hides and at the same time distorts dialectic. In recent decades, however, a more charitable approach has emerged: it has been recognized that, in Troeltsch’s perspective, compromise is not the expression of a resigned Irenism, but the historical realization of ideal aspirations. Such a realization that will always be imperfect because as it is conditioned by circumstances: in the human being the constitutive inclination to the ‘ultimate things’ will coexist with an equally intrinsic finiteness.

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