An axiomatic version of Fitch’s paradox

Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020 (2013)
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Abstract

A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the paradox

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Samuel Allen Alexander
Ohio State University (PhD)

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