Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study

In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 97-117 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Jennifer Nagel (2010) has recently proposed a fascinating account of the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge in conversational contexts in which unrealized possibilities of error have been mentioned. Her account appeals to epistemic egocentrism, or what is sometimes called the curse of knowledge, an egocentric bias to attribute our own mental states to other people (and sometimes our own future and past selves). Our aim in this paper is to investigate the empirical merits of Nagel’s hypothesis about the psychology involved in knowledge attribution.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ALESAE-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-04-23
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-04-23

Total views
354 ( #6,900 of 37,261 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #6,368 of 37,261 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.