Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study

In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 97-117 (2014)
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Abstract

Jennifer Nagel (2010) has recently proposed a fascinating account of the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge in conversational contexts in which unrealized possibilities of error have been mentioned. Her account appeals to epistemic egocentrism, or what is sometimes called the curse of knowledge, an egocentric bias to attribute our own mental states to other people (and sometimes our own future and past selves). Our aim in this paper is to investigate the empirical merits of Nagel’s hypothesis about the psychology involved in knowledge attribution.

Author Profiles

Chad Gonnerman
University of Southern Indiana
John Philip Waterman
University of New England (United States)

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