Una presentación formal del falsacionismo

Analítica (forthcoming)
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In this paper I present the concepts of falsificationism omitting Popper's requirement of consistency. This omission makes (i) trivial theories falsifiable in an inappropriate sense of the term, but also (ii) some inconsistent non trivial theories in an appropriate sense of the term. This justifies a slight alteration of the definition of falsifiability that excludes (i) but allows (ii). Instead of requiring that a falsifiable theories be consistent, the new definition only requires that the intersection of its classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers be empty.
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First archival date: 2019-10-16
Latest version: 2 (2020-01-24)
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