La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción

Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:123-136 (2017)
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C.S. Peirce defended a pragmatist view of assertion in terms of its normative effect. This paper has two goals. First, to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s argument for the thesis that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. Second, to argue that Peirce interpreted “responsibility for truth” as the acquisition of a dialogical commitment, namely, the duty to defend the proposition asserted by giving reasons upon challenge.

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Jaime Alfaro Iglesias
Universidade de São Paulo


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