La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
C.S. Peirce defended a pragmatist view of assertion in terms of its normative effect. This paper has two goals. First, to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s argument for the thesis that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. Second, to argue that Peirce interpreted “responsibility for truth” as the acquisition of a dialogical commitment, namely, the duty to defend the proposition asserted by giving reasons upon challenge.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-07-27
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
What Is Assertion.MacFarlane, John
Assertion: New Philosophical Essays.Brown, Jessica & Cappelen, Herman (eds.)
Against Assertion.Cappelen, Herman

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
169 ( #23,885 of 48,949 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #23,317 of 48,949 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.