Causation, Norm violation, and culpable control

Journal of Philosophy 108 (12):670-696 (2011)
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Abstract
Causation is one of philosophy's most venerable and thoroughly-analyzed concepts. However, the study of how ordinary people make causal judgments is a much more recent addition to the philosophical arsenal. One of the most prominent views of causal explanation, especially in the realm of harmful or potentially harmful behavior, is that unusual or counternormative events are accorded privileged status in ordinary causal explanations. This is a fundamental assumption in psychological theories of counterfactual reasoning, and has been transported to philosophy by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). A different view--the basis of the culpable control model of blame (CCM)--is that primary causal status is accorded to behaviors that arouse negative evaluative reactions, including behaviors that stem from nefarious motives, negligence or recklessness, a faulty character, or behaviors that lead to harmful or potentially harmful consequences. This paper describes four empirical studies that show consistent support for the CCM.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
0022-362X  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ALICNV
Revision history
Archival date: 2012-08-01
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References found in this work BETA
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to its Alternatives.Kahneman, Daniel & Miller, Dale T.
Blaming Badly.Alicke, Mark

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Citations of this work BETA
Experimental Philosophy.Knobe, Joshua; Buckwalter, Wesley; Nichols, Shaun; Robbins, Philip; Sarkissian, Hagop & Sommers, Tamler
Graded Causation and Defaults.Halpern, Joseph Y. & Hitchcock, Christopher
Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment.Newman, George E.; De Freitas, Julian & Knobe, Joshua
Causal Superseding.Kominsky, Jonathan F.; Phillips, Jonathan; Gerstenberg, Tobias; Lagnado, David & Knobe, Joshua

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2010-11-26

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