A Defence of Emotivism

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Abstract
As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
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ALLADO-10
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First archival date: 2016-04-28
Latest version: 2 (2017-06-16)
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Theories of Ethics.Foot, Philippa
Ethics Since 1900.Welsh, Paul & Warnock, Mary

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2016-04-28

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