A Tale of Two Froggies

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):104-115 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I argue that selection of the best theory of content is not a matter for mere philosophical reflection on the consequences of each theory for our intuitive judgments about content. Rather, the theories must be judged in a different way that is based on the putative roles of content attribution in the behavioural sciences. The ultimate test of any theory of content will be the success of the sciences that adopt it. Furthermore, alternative semantic theories may be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. Different approaches to content specification may well be compatible, reflecting different but perhaps equally legitimate explanatory goals.

Author's Profile

Colin Allen
University of California, Santa Barbara

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-01

Downloads
533 (#44,060)

6 months
58 (#85,505)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?