Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access?

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Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people's minds. This seems incompatible with "privileged access"---the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for this suggestion, concluding that Carruthers's new theory cannot clearly preserve the superior reliability of our beliefs about our own attitudes.
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First archival date: 2014-07-27
Latest version: 4 (2016-01-29)
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