Dispositions, Rule-Following, and Infinity

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Abstract
The going-on problem (GOP) is the central concern of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It informs not only his epistemology and philosophy of mind, but also his views on mathematics, universals, and religion. In section I, I frame this issue as a matter of accounting for intentionality. Here I follow Saul Kripke's lead. My departure therefrom follows: first, a criticism of Wittgenstein's “straight” conventionalism and, secondly, a defense of a solution Kripke rejects. I proceed under the assumption, borne out in the end, that statements of rule-following have truth-conditions and are not, as Kripke seems willing to concede, merely "assertible" in circumstances of a specified sort. Ultimately, my goal is to demonstrate that intending can be understood in terms of an individual's dispositions rather than those of the community to which she belongs.
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Archival date: 2021-03-06
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