Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the subjectivists' response to the problem of demarcating moral from non-moral judgements.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ALLIMS-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-06-21
Latest version: 2 (2017-06-16)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-06-21

Total views
1,203 ( #2,502 of 52,923 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
154 ( #2,801 of 52,923 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.