Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the subjectivists' response to the problem of demarcating moral from non-moral judgements.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ALLIMS-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-06-21
Latest version: 2 (2017-06-16)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.
.Harman, Gilbert
The Nature of Morality.Phillips, D. Z. & Harman, Gilbert

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-06-21

Total views
863 ( #2,795 of 43,686 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
180 ( #2,237 of 43,686 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.