Mirror, Mirror in the Brain, What's the Monkey Stand to Gain?

Noûs 44 (2):372 - 391 (2010)
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Abstract
Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called "mirror neurons" in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionahty, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view
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References found in this work BETA
Primate Cognition.Seed, Amanda & Tomasello, Michael
Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition.Tomasello, Michael; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Behne, Tanya & Moll, Henrike

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