Frege Cases and Bad Psychological Laws

Mind 130 (520):1253-1280 (2021)
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We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege’s Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional-attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.

Author Profiles

Aidan Gray
University of Illinois, Chicago
Mahrad Almotahari
University of Edinburgh


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