Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516 (2003)
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Abstract
Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil
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Skeptical Theism.McBrayer, Justin P.

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