The structure of egocentric space

In Frédérique de Vignemont, Hong Yu Wong, Andrea Serino & Alessandro Farné (eds.), The World at Our Fingertips: A multidisciplinary exploration of peripersonal space. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This chapter offers an indirect defence of the Evansian conception of egocentric space, by showing how it resolves a puzzle concerning the unity of egocentric spatial perception. The chapter outlines several common assumptions about egocentric perspectival structure and argues that a subject’s experience, both within and across her sensory modalities, may involve multiple structures of this kind. This raises the question of how perspectival unity is achieved, such that these perspectival structures form a complex whole, rather than merely disunified set of individually, distinctively structured experiences. The shortcomings of variety of accounts are considered: switch accounts ; sensory accounts; transformation accounts; and ultimate accounts. These shortcomings are addressed by a further kind of account provided by the Evansian conception – an agentive account – according to which egocentrically structured experiences present the world in relation to parts of a single thing, the body as a dynamic unity.
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Archival date: 2020-05-15
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