Narcissism, Entitlement, Responsibility

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the topic of moral responsibility for ‘non-ideal’ agents. And yet, one important type of ‘non-ideal’ agent, the narcissistic agent, has not received much attention. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap. My focus is on psychological entitlement, a feature that has been largely overlooked. I argue that this feature impairs narcissistic agents’ moral competence. This is because it both causes them to form distorted moral assessments in a wide range of situations and impairs their ability to use feedback from others to correct these distortions. I conclude that narcissistic agents have mitigated responsibility owing to their impaired moral competence. As I furthermore show, this does not entail that we simply need to accept the damage they do. Rather, we may take steps to protect ourselves against the destructive effects of narcissistic entitlement, both on a personal and on a societal level.

Author's Profile

Hannah Altehenger
Universität Konstanz

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-02-25

Downloads
130 (#98,418)

6 months
130 (#41,937)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?