Thick Concepts as Social Factors of Oppression on Moral Decisions and Injustice

Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values 9 (No. 4): pp. 116–128. Translated by Yue QI (2022)
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Abstract

Social dimension of moral responsibility has started to gain more attention in moral philosophy, be it within the network of action theory, or any other meta-ethical domain. Although there are many social acts and therefore social dimensions of responsibility, I aim to indicate one aspect of sociality in our thinking and practice, particularly in our moral thinking, that is the thick concepts. In this work, I consider Vargas’s concept moral ecology (2015, 2018) as a tool to understand certain social aspects of moral responsibility, while claiming to extend his line of thinking in moral ecology by giving a more active role to the individual agent within the ecology that she is engaged in. I claim that when we understand the relationships between the agent and her surrounding ecology in a more complex, and under certain circumstances in a rather reciprocal way, we can have a better and more nuanced understanding of non-ideal moral landscapes that we are engaged in, while maintaining a certain kind of responsibility to the agents in their social environments. I will use the term niche construction and niche selection – concept that are already at use within the similar biological line of thought within action – to refer to such situations where agents are actively shaping their environments.

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Ozan Altinok
Universität Hannover

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