Singularidade fenomênica e conteúdo perceptivo

Manuscrito 41 (1):67-91 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware of the sketchy and schematic way in which my proposal is advanced and the other alternatives are criticized, I hope this paper is still worth its ink at least insofar as it is capable of pointing to a novel and promising way out of old and resilient difficulties that have been haunting philosophers of perception. If not a fully developed theory, at least I deliver here a sketch that, or so I sell, is worth the bet.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-03-12
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
99 ( #50,394 of 69,114 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #54,200 of 69,114 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.