Naïve realism and unconscious perception: A reply to Berger and Nanay

Analysis 77 (2):267-273 (2017)
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Abstract
In a recent paper, Berger and Nanay consider, and reject, three ways of addressing the phenomenon of unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. Since these three approaches seem to exhaust the options open to naïve realists, and since there is said to be excellent evidence that perception of the same fundamental kind can occur, both consciously and unconsciously, this is seen to present a problem for the view. We take this opportunity to show that all three approaches considered remain perfectly plausible ways of addressing unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. So far from undermining the credibility of naïve realism, Berger and Nanay simply draw our attention to an important question to be considered by naïve realists in future work. Namely, which of the approaches considered is most likely to provide an accurate account of unconscious perception in each of its purported incarnations?
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First archival date: 2017-04-27
Latest version: 2 (2020-07-04)
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References found in this work BETA
Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy.Dehaene, Stanislas; Changeux, Jean-Pierre; Naccache, Lionel; Sackur, Jérôme & Sergent, Claire
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.

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Citations of this work BETA
Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity.Clarke, Sam & Anaya, Alfonso

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2017-04-08

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