The Truth Assignments That Differentiate Human Reasoning From Mechanistic Reasoning: The Evidence-Based Argument for Lucas' Goedelian Thesis

Cognitive Systems Research 40:35-45 (2016)
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Abstract
We consider the argument that Tarski's classic definitions permit an intelligence---whether human or mechanistic---to admit finitary evidence-based definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two, hitherto unsuspected and essentially different, ways: (1) in terms of classical algorithmic verifiabilty; and (2) in terms of finitary algorithmic computability. We then show that the two definitions correspond to two distinctly different assignments of satisfaction and truth to the compound formulas of PA over N---I_PA(N; SV ) and I_PA(N; SC). We further show that the PA axioms are true over N, and that the PA rules of inference preserve truth over N, under both I_PA(N; SV ) and I_PA(N; SC). We then show: (a) that if we assume the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always non-finitarily decidable under I_PA(N; SV ), then this assignment corresponds to the classical non-finitary putative standard interpretation I_PA(N; S) of PA over the domain N; and (b) that the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always finitarily decidable under the assignment I_PA(N; SC), from which we may finitarily conclude that PA is consistent. We further conclude that the appropriate inference to be drawn from Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions is that we can define PA formulas which---under interpretation---are algorithmically verifiable as always true over N, but not algorithmically computable as always true over N. We conclude from this that Lucas' Goedelian argument is validated if the assignment I_PA(N; SV ) can be treated as circumscribing the ambit of human reasoning about `true' arithmetical propositions, and the assignment I_PA(N; SC) as circumscribing the ambit of mechanistic reasoning about `true' arithmetical propositions.
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