Fatalism and Future Contingents

Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):1-14 (2019)
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Abstract
In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar in spirit and intimately connected with fatalism, in the sense that they engage with the doctrine of fatalism and accept a large part of a standard fatalistic machinery.
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First archival date: 2019-03-22
Latest version: 2 (2019-04-03)
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An Essay on Free Will.Van Inwagen, Peter

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2018-09-22

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