Hume, Causation and Counterfactuals

Humanites Bulletin 2 (1):36-49 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What is offered here is an interpretation of Hume’s views on causation. While it might not be literally Hume’s view, it is certainly consistent with Hume, and is probably what Hume should say on causation, in light of recent developments in science and logic. As a way in, it is argued that the considerations that Hume brings against rationalist theories of causation can be applied to counterfactual theories of causation. Since, counterfactuals, possible worlds and modality were not ideas that would have been overly familiar to Hume, some supplementation of Hume’s arguments will be necessary.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ANDHCA-4
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-06-03
Latest version: 3 (2020-07-14)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-06-03

Total views
183 ( #26,826 of 55,833 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #12,956 of 55,833 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.