Hume, Causation and Counterfactuals

Humanites Bulletin 2 (1):36-49 (2019)
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Abstract

What is offered here is an interpretation of Hume’s views on causation. While it might not be literally Hume’s view, it is certainly consistent with Hume, and is probably what Hume should say on causation, in light of recent developments in science and logic. As a way in, it is argued that the considerations that Hume brings against rationalist theories of causation can be applied to counterfactual theories of causation. Since, counterfactuals, possible worlds and modality were not ideas that would have been overly familiar to Hume, some supplementation of Hume’s arguments will be necessary.

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Joshua Anderson
Virginia State University

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