Hume, Causation and Counterfactuals

Humanites Bulletin 2 (1):36-49 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What is offered here is an interpretation of Hume’s views on causation. While it might not be literally Hume’s view, it is certainly consistent with Hume, and is probably what Hume should say on causation, in light of recent developments in science and logic. As a way in, it is argued that the considerations that Hume brings against rationalist theories of causation can be applied to counterfactual theories of causation. Since, counterfactuals, possible worlds and modality were not ideas that would have been overly familiar to Hume, some supplementation of Hume’s arguments will be necessary.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ANDHCA-4
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-06-03
Latest version: 2 (2019-06-05)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-06-03

Total views
70 ( #32,947 of 44,295 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #13,912 of 44,295 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.