The Hodgsonian account of temporal experience

In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson's account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson's account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson's account is then compared to Husserl's, and I argue that Hodgson's account offers a better target for projects such as neurophenomenology than does Husserl's. Hodgson's account is historically important as a culmination of a certain trajectory of British Empiricist thought. It offers a substantive alternative for how to think about temporality and experience in contemporary discussions, not just of the present moment but of the relationship between experience and knowledge more broadly.
Reprint years
2016, 2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ANDTHA-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-07-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-07-30

Total views
311 ( #17,102 of 56,119 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #22,727 of 56,119 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.