Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):550-566 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that Feltz and Millan’s error-theory rests on a conceptual confusion: it is perfectly acceptable for a certain brand of compatibilist to judge free will and fatalism to be compatible, as long as fatalism does not prevent agents from being the source of their actions. We then present the results of two studies showing that laypeople’s intuitions are best understood as following a certain brand of source compatibilism rather than a “free-will-no-matter-what” strategy.
Reprint years
2016
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ANDWCI-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-04-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Murray, Dylan & Nahmias, Eddy
An Essay on Free Will.Van Inwagen, Peter

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-04-13

Total downloads
465 ( #4,770 of 37,122 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #11,150 of 37,122 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.