As quatro causas na filosofia da natureza de Aristóteles

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I have two aims in this paper. First, I argue that, in Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, there is a basic and common feature by which all causes are causes: they all work in a triadic framework in which they explain why a given attribute holds of a given underlying thing. Secondly, I argue against a version of “compatibilism” according to which each kind of cause is complete in its own domain and does not compete with any other kind. I claim that there are priority relations according to which some kinds of cause are subordinated to others, even if these relations do not hold in every cases.
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Archival date: 2014-06-06
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